A complexity-theoretic model for public-key steganography with active attacks is introduced. The notion of steganographic security against adaptive chosen-covertext attacks (SS-CCA) and a relaxation called steganographic security against replayable adaptive chosen-covertext attacks (SS-RCCA) are formalized. These notions are closely related with CCA-security and RCCA-security for public-key cryptosystems. In particular, it is shown that any SS-(R)CCA stegosystem is an (R)CCA-secure public-key cryptosystem and that an SS-RCCA stegosystem can be realized from any RCCA-secure public-key cryptosystem with pseudorandom ciphertexts.
Introduction
Steganography is the art and science of hiding information by embedding messages within other, seemingly harmless messages. As the goal of steganography is to hide the presence of a message, it can be seen as the complement of cryptography, whose goal is to hide the content of a message.
Consider two parties linked by a public communications channel which is under the control of an adversary. The parties are allowed to exchange messages as long as they are not adding a hidden meaning to their conversation. A genuine communication message is called covertext; but if the sender of a message has embedded hidden information in a message, it is called stegotext. The adversary, who also knows the distribution of the covertext, tries to detect whether a given message is covertext or stegotext.
Steganography has a long history as surveyed by Anderson and Petitcolas [2] , but formal models for steganography have only recently been introduced. Several information-theoretic formalizations [4, 22, 13] and one complexity-theoretic model [11] have addressed private-key steganography, where the participants share a common secret key. These models are all limited to a passive adversary, however, who can only read messages on the channel.
In this paper, we introduce a complexity-theoretic model for public-key steganography with active attacks, where the participants a priori do not need shared secret information and the adversary may write to the channel and mount a so-called adaptive chosen-covertext attack. This attack seems to be the most general attack conceivable against a public-key stegosystem. It allows the adversary to send an arbitrary sequence of adaptively chosen covertext messages to a receiver and to learn the interpretation of every message, i.e., if the receiver considers a message to be covertext or stegotext, plus the decoding of the embedded message in the latter case. (Note that here and in the sequel, a message on the channel is also called a "covertext" whenever we do not want to distinguish stegotext and covertext in the proper sense. ) We do not address denial-of-service attacks in this work, where the adversary tries to disrupt the hidden communication among the participants. Although they also qualify as "active" attacks and are very important in practice, we think that protection against them can be addressed orthogonally to the methods presented here.
Our model is based on the intuition that a public-key stegosystem essentially is a public-key cryptosystem with the additional requirement that its output conforms to a given covertext distribution. As in the formalization of private-key steganography [4, 11, 15] , the covertext distribution is publicly known and accessible only through an oracle that samples the distribution. We introduce the notions of steganographic security against adaptive chosen-covertext attacks (SS-CCA) and steganographic security against replayable adaptive chosen-covertext attacks (SS-RCCA) and show that they are closely linked to the analogous notions for public-key cryptosystems, called security against adaptive chosenciphertext attacks (or CCA-security) [14] and security against replayable adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks [5] (or RCCA-security), respectively. In particular, we show that stegosystems are related to public-key cryptosystems in the following ways:
Theorem 1 (informal statement). Any SS-(R)CCA stegosystem is an (R)CCA-secure public-key cryptosystem.

Theorem 2 (informal statement). An SS-RCCA stegosystem can be constructed from any RCCA-secure public-key cryptosystem whose ciphertexts are pseudorandom (i.e., computationally indistinguishable from a random bit string).
A corollary of Theorem 2 is that SS-RCCA stegosystems exist in the standard model and in the random oracle model. The stegosystem constructed in the proof of Theorem 2 embeds more hidden bits per stegotext than any previous system. It is not known if a result analogous to Theorem 2 holds for CCA-security; finding an SS-CCA stegosystem remains an interesting open problem.
Our model for public-key steganography is introduced in Section 2, where also the relation to previous work is discussed. Section 3 recalls the definitions of CCA-and RCCA-security for public-key cryptosystems, states our results formally, and presents the proof of Theorem 1. Section 4 gives the construction of an SS-RCCA stegosystem and proves Theorem 2.
Definitions
Notation
. A (randomized) algorithm is called efficient if its running time is bounded by a polynomial except with negligible probability (over the coin tosses of the algorithm).
Let Ü Ý denote the algorithm that assigns a value Ý to Ü. If A´¡µ is a (randomized) algorithm, the notation Ü A´Ýµ denotes the algorithm that assigns to Ü a randomly selected value according to the probability distribution induced by A´¡µ with input Ý over the set of its outputs.
If Ë is a probability distribution, then the notation Ü Ê Ë denotes the algorithm which assigns to Ü an element randomly selected according to Ë. If Ë is a finite set, then the notation Ü Ê Ë denotes the algorithm which assigns to Ü an element selected at random from Ë with uniform distribution over Ë.
denotes the probability that Ô´Ü Ý ¡ ¡ ¡ µ will be true after the ordered execution of the algorithms Ü 
Public-key Stegosystems
We define a public-key stegosystem as a triple of algorithms for key generation, message encoding, and message decoding, respectively. The notion corresponds to a public-key cryptosystem in which the ciphertext should conform to a target covertext distribution.
For the scope of this work, the covertext is modeled by a distribution over a given set . The distribution is only available via an oracle; it samples upon request, with each sample being independent. In other words, it outputs a sequence of independent and identically distributed covertexts. W.l.o.g.,
The restriction to independent repetitions is made here only to simplify the notation and to focus on the contribution of this work. All our definitions and results can be extended in the canonical way to the very general model of a covertext channel as introduced by Hopper et al. [11] . They model a channel as an unbounded sequence of values drawn from a set whose distribution may depend in arbitrary ways on past outputs; access to the channel is given only by an oracle that samples from the channel.
Such a channel underlies only one restriction: The sampling oracle must allow random access to the channel distribution, i.e., the oracle can be queried with an arbitrary prefix of a possible channel output and will return the next symbol according to the channel distribution. In other words, the channel sampler cannot only be rewound to an earlier state of its execution but also restarted from a given state. (Hence it may be difficult to use an email conversation among humans for a covertext channel since that cannot easily be rewound.)
The sampling oracle for the covertext distribution is available to all users and to the adversary. In order to avoid technical complications, assume w.l.o.g. that the sampling oracle is implemented by a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm and therefore does not help an adversary beyond its own capabilities (for example, with solving a computationally hard problem). The steganographic decoding algorithm SD takes as inputs the security parameter , a secret key ssk, and a covertext ¾ and outputs either a message Ñ ¾ ¼ ½ Ð or a special symbol .
An output value of indicates a decoding error, for example, when SD has determined that no message is embedded in .
We require that for all´spk sskµ output by SK´½ µ and for all Ñ ¾ ¼ ½ Ð , the probability that SD´½ ssk SE´½ spk Ñµµ Ñ is negligible in .
Note that except for the presence of the covertext distribution, this definition is equivalent to that of a public-key cryptosystem. Although all algorithms have oracle access to , only SE needs it in the stegosystems considered in this paper. For ease of notation, the security parameter will be omitted henceforth.
The probability that the decoding algorithm outputs the correct embedded message is referred to as the reliability of the stegosystem. Although one might also allow a non-negligible decoding error in the definition of a stegosystem (as done in previous work [11] ), we require that the decoding error probability is negligible in order to maintain the analogy between a stegosystem and a cryptosystem.
Security definition. Coming up with the "right" security definition for a cryptographic primitive has always been a challenging task because the sufficiency of a security property cannot be demonstrated by running the cryptosystem. Only its insufficiency can be shown by pointing out a specific attack, but finding an attack is usually hard. Often, security definitions had to be strengthened when a primitive was used as part of a larger system. Probably the most typical example is the security of publickey cryptosystems: the original notion of semantic security [10] , which considers only a passive or eavesdropping adversary, was later augmented to security against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks or non-malleability, which allows also for active attacks [14, 9, 3] .
We introduce here the notion of steganographic security against adaptive chosen-covertext attacks, abbreviated SS-CCA, and its slightly relaxed variant steganographic security against replayable chosencovertext attacks, abbreviated SS-RCCA. Both notions are based on the intuition that a stegosystem is essentially a cryptosystem with a prescribed ciphertext distribution.
SS-CCA and SS-RCCA are defined by the following experiment. Let an arbitrary distribution on a set be given and consider a (stego-)adversary, defined by two arbitrary probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms SA ½ and SA ¾ . The experiment consists of five stages where both notions only differ in the fourth stage.
Key generation:
A key pair´spk sskµ is generated by the key generation algorithm SK.
First decoding stage:
Algorithm SA ½ is run with the public key spk as input and has access to the sampling oracle for and to a decoding oracle SO ½ . The decoding oracle knows the secret key ssk. Whenever it receives a covertext , it runs SD´ssk µ and returns the result to SA ½ .
When SA ½ finishes its execution, it outputs a tuple´Ñ £ ×µ, where Ñ £ ¾ ¼ ½ Ð is a message and × is some additional information which the algorithm wants to preserve.
Challenge: A bit is chosen at random and a challenge covertext £ is determined depending on it: If
£ is given to algorithm SA ¾ , who should guess the value of , i.e., determine whether the message Ñ £ has been embedded in £ or whether £ has simply been chosen according to .
Second decoding stage:
SA ¾ is run on input Ñ £ , £ , and ×, i.e., it knows the message which is potentially embedded, the challenge covertext, and the state provided by SA ½ .
For SS-CCA, SA ¾ may access a decoding oracle SO ¾ , which is analogous to SO ½ except that upon receiving query £ , oracle SO ¾ returns not-allowed. Note that this leaves the adversary free to query the decoding oracle with any element of the covertext space before the challenge is issued. By definition, an SS-CCA stegosystem is also SS-RCCA.
Discussion
The relation to public-key cryptosystems. A stegosystem should allow for two parties to communicate over a public channel in such a way that the presence of a message in the conversation cannot be detected by an adversary. It seems natural to conclude from this that the adversary must not learn any useful information about an embedded message, should there be one. The latter property is the subject of cryptography: hiding the content of a message transmitted over a public channel. This motivates our approach of modeling a public-key stegosystem after a public-key cryptosystem in which the ciphertext conforms to a particular covertext distribution.
The most widely accepted formal notion of a public-key cryptosystem secure against an active adversary is indistinguishability of encryptions against an adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack (CCAsecurity) [14] and is equivalent to non-malleability of ciphertexts in the same attack model [9, 3] . CCAsecurity is defined by an experiment with almost the same stages as above, except that the first part of the adversary outputs two messages Ñ ¼ and Ñ ½ , of which one is chosen at random and then encrypted.
The resulting value £ , also called the target ciphertext, is returned to the adversary and the adversary has to guess what has been encrypted. In the second query stage, the adversary is allowed to obtain decryptions of any ciphertext except for £ . This appears to the minimal requirement to make the definition of a cryptosystem meaningful, but it has turned out to be overly restrictive in some cases. For example, consider a CCA-secure cryptosystem where a useless bit is appended to each ciphertext during encryption and that is ignored during decryption. Although this clearly does not affect the security of the cryptosystem, the modified scheme is no longer CCA-secure.
Several authors have relaxed CCA-security to allow for such changes [17, 1, 5] ; the weakest one among the relaxed notions is called replayable CCA-security or RCCA-security [5] . The only difference to CCA-security is that in the second query stage, the adversary is more restricted and does not allow any query that decrypts to either one of the messages Ñ ¼ or Ñ ½ . The intuition is that such a cryptosystem allows anyone to modify a ciphertext into an equivalent one and therefore "replay" the target ciphertext.
Our notion of an SS-CCA stegosystem is analogous to a CCA-secure cryptosystem, in that it only excludes the target covertext from the queries to the second decoding oracle. Likewise, our notion of an SS-RCCA stegosystem contains a restriction that is reminiscent of an RCCA-secure cryptosystem, by not allowing queries that decode either to the test message or to . These similarities are no coincidence: We show in Section 3 that any SS-CCA stegosystem is an CCA-secure public-key cryptosystem, and similarly for their replayable counterparts.
Previous models for steganography. The first published model of a steganographic system is the "Prisoners' Problem" by Simmons [19] . This work addresses the particular situation of message authentication among two communicating parties, where a so-called subliminal channel might be used to transport a hidden message in the view of an adversary who tries to detect the presence of a hidden message. Although a subliminal channel in that sense is only made possible by the existence of message authentication in the model, it can be seen as the first formulation of a general model for steganography.
Cachin [4] presented an information-theoretic model for steganography, which was the first to explicitly require that the stegotext distribution is indistinguishable from the covertext distribution to an adversary. Since the model is unconditional, a statistical information measure is used.
Hopper et al. [11] give the first complexity-theoretic model for private-key steganography with passive attacks; they point out that a stegosystem is similar to a cryptosystem whose ciphertext is indistinguishable from a given covertext. In Section 3 we establish such an equivalence formally for public-key systems.
Recently, von Ahn and Hopper [20] have formalized public-key steganography with a passive adversary, i.e., one who can mount a chosen-message attack. The resulting notion is the analogue of a cryptosystem with security against chosen-plaintext attacks (i.e., a cryptosystem with semantic security). They also formalized the notion of a stegosystem that offers security against "attacker-specific" chosen-stegotext attacks; this means that the decoder must know the identity of the encoder, however, and restricts the usefulness of their notion compared to SS-CCA and SS-RCCA.
No satisfying formal model for public-key steganography with active attacks has been published so far, although the subject was discussed by several authors, and some systems with heuristic security have been proposed [8, 2] . A crucial element that seems to make our formalizations useful is the restriction of the stage-two decoding oracle depending on the challenge covertext.
Results
This section investigates the relation between SS-(R)CCA stegosystems and (R)CCA-secure public-key cryptosystems. Two results are presented:
1. Any SS-CCA stegosystem is a CCA-secure public-key cryptosystem and, similarly, any SS-RCCA stegosystem is an RCCA-secure public-key cryptosystem.
2. An SS-RCCA stegosystem can be constructed from any RCCA-secure public-key cryptosystem whose ciphertexts are pseudorandom.
We first recall the formal definitions for public-key encryption with CCA-and RCCA-security, respectively. A public-key cryptosystem is a triple´K E Dµ of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms.
Algorithm K, on input the security parameter , generates a pair of keys´× Ô µ. The encryption and decryption algorithms, E and D, have the property that for any pair´× Ô µ generated by K and for any plaintext message Ñ ¾ ¼ ½ Ð , the probability that D´½ × E´½ pk Ñµµ Ñ is negligible in .
(The security parameter is omitted henceforth.)
CCA-security and RCCA-security for a public-key encryption scheme are defined by the following experiment. Consider an adversary defined by two arbitrary polynomial-time algorithms ½ and ¾ .
First, a key pair´Ô × µ is generated by K. Next, ½ is run on input the public key Ô and may access a decryption oracle Ç ½ . Oracle Ç ½ knows the secret key × , and whenever it receives a ciphertext , it applies D with key × to and returns the result to ½ . When ½ finishes its execution, it outputs a triple´Ñ ¼ Ñ ½ ×µ, where Ñ ¼ Ñ ½ ¾ ¼ ½ Ð are two arbitrary messages and × is some additional state information. Now a bit is chosen at random and Ñ is encrypted using E under key Ô , resulting in a ciphertext £ . Algorithm ¾ is given Ñ ¼ and Ñ ½ , ciphertext £ , and state ×, and has to guess the value of , i.e., whether Ñ ¼ or Ñ ½ has been encrypted. For CCA-security, ¾ may access a decryption oracle Ç ¾ , which is analogous to Ç ½ and knows × , but returns not-allowed upon receiving query £ .
For RCCA-security, ¾ may access a decryption oracle Ç Ö ¾ , which is identical to Ç ½ except that any query that decrypts to one of the messages Ñ ¼ and Ñ ½ are answered by not-allowed. Finally, ¾ outputs a bit ¼ as its guess for .
A secure cryptosystem requires that no efficient adversary can distinguish an encryption of Ñ ¼ from an encryption of Ñ ½ except with negligible probability.
Definition 3.
[(R)CCA-Security for Public-Key Cryptosystems [3, 5] ] Let ª ´K E Dµ be a publickey cryptosystem. We say that ª is CCA-secure if for all polynomial-time adversaries ´ ½ ¾ µ,
there exists a negligible function¯such that
The following is our first main result.
Theorem 1. Let ¦ ´SK SE SDµ denote a public-key stegosystem. If ¦ is SS-CCA (SS-RCCA) with respect to some distribution , then ¦ is an CCA-secure (RCCA-secure) public-key cryptosystem.
Proof. Note first that ¦ satisfies the definition of a public-key cryptosystem. We prove that ¦ is (R)CCA-secure by a reduction argument. Assume that ¦ is not an (R)CCA-secure cryptosystem and hence there exists an (encryption-)adversary´ ½ ¾ µ that breaks the (R)CCA-security of ¦, i.e., it wins in the experiment of Definition 3 with probability ½ ¾ ·AE´ µ for some non-negligible function AE. Let be an arbitrary distribution. We construct a (stego-)adversary´SA ½ SA ¾ µ against ¦ as a stegosystem with respect to that has black-box access to´ ½ ¾ µ as follows.
Key generation:
When SA ½ receives a public-key, it invokes ½ with this key. 
First decoding stage:
However, since D´× ¼ µ Ñ ¼ except with negligible probability by the definition of a public-key cryptosystem, the query ¼ is also not allowed for the decryption oracle Ç Ö ¾ and ¾ will receive the correct answer not-allowed, except with negligible probability.
Because ¾ makes at most a polynomial number of queries to the decryption oracle Ç ¾ , the probability that at least one of them is allowed for decryption but not allowed for the decoding oracle SO ¾ is also negligible. Hence, SA ¾ correctly simulates the decryption oracle Ç ¾ to ¾ except with some negligible probability¯£´ µ.
Since the encryption-adversary ¾ by assumption breaks the (R)CCA-security of the cryptosystem, and ¾ is independent of ¼ when ½ as argued above, we have ÈÖ ¼ £ ¼℄ ½ ¾ ·¾AE´ µ ¯£´ µ.
By the definition of SA ¾ , this is also the probability that the stego-adversary guesses correctly when ¼. Hence, the overall probability that SA ¾ guesses correctly is by a non-negligible quantity and shows that ¦ is not SS-(R)CCA with respect to any . Theorem 1 shows that an SS-CCA stegosystem is a special case of a CCA-secure public-key cryptosystem, and similarly for their replayable variants. In the converse direction, we show now that some RCCA-secure public-key cryptosystems, namely those with "pseudorandom ciphertexts," can also be used to construct SS-RCCA stegosystems. Constructing an SS-CCA stegosystem from a CCA-secure public-key cryptosystem -or from other assumptions, for that matter -remains an open problem.
In a cryptosystem with pseudorandom ciphertexts, the encryption algorithm outputs a bit string that is indistinguishable from a random string of the same length for any efficient distinguisher that has knowledge of the public key. We make the usual assumption that the encryption of a plaintext of length Ð always results in a ciphertext of length ´Ðµ.
Definition 4.
[Public-key Cryptosystem with Pseudorandom Ciphertexts [20] ] A public-key cryptosystem´K E Dµ is said to have pseudorandom ciphertexts if for any key pair´× Ô µ generated by K, any Ñ ¾ ¼ ½ Ð , and all probabilistic polynomial-time distinguishers , there exists a negligible function8 such that
It seems difficult to construct SS-(R)CCA stegosystems for any covertext distribution. We show that it is possible for covertexts whose distribution conforms to a sequence of independently repeated experiments. (According to the remark in Section 2.2, this result generalizes to an arbitrary covertext channel.) Given a covertext distribution and positive Ø, let Ø denote the probability distribution consisting of a sequence of Ø independent repetitions of .
The next theorem is our second main result. Its proof is the subject of Section 4.
Theorem 2. SS-RCCA stegosystems with respect to a covertext distribution Ø for any with sufficiently large min-entropy can be efficiently constructed from any RCCA-secure cryptosystem with pseudorandom ciphertexts.
Theorem 2 leaves us with the task of finding an RCCA-secure cryptosystem with pseudorandom ciphertexts. Such cryptosystems exist under a variety of standard assumptions if one asks for security against a passive adversary only, i.e., security against chosen-plaintext attacks (CPA). For example, von Ahn and Hopper [20] demonstrate a scheme that is as secure as RSA and one that is secure under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption. It is also straightforward to verify that the generic method of encrypting a single bit by xoring it with the hard-core predicate of a trapdoor one-way permutation has pseudorandom ciphertexts.
But any RCCA-secure cryptosystem can be turned into one with pseudorandom ciphertexts using the following method, suggested by Lindell [12] : Take the ciphertext output by the RCCA-secure encryption algorithm and encrypt it again, using a second cryptosystem with pseudorandom ciphertexts, which is secure against chosen-plaintext attacks. Decryption proceeds analogously, by first applying the decryption operation of the second cryptosystem and then the decryption operation of the RCCA-secure cryptosystem. It can be verified that the composed cryptosystem retains RCCA-security because the stage-two decryption oracle knows both secret keys. This method yields SS-RCCA stegosystems in several models as follows.
By applying the generic construction of a CPA-secure cryptosystem with pseudorandom ciphertexts to a generic non-malleable cryptosystem [9, 16] , we conclude that SS-RCCA stegosystems exist under general assumptions.
Corollary 3. Provided that trapdoor one-way permutations exist, there is an SS-RCCA stegosystem in the common random string model.
Using the mentioned DDH-based cryptosystem with pseudorandom ciphertexts combined with the Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem [7] , we obtain also an efficient SS-RCCA stegosystem in the standard model.
Corollary 4. Under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption, there is an SS-RCCA stegosystem.
A more practical cryptosystem with pseudorandom ciphertexts exists also in the random oracle model: the OAEP+ scheme of Shoup [18] . OAEP+ is a CCA-secure cryptosystem based on an arbitrary trapdoor one-way permutation. The encoding process of the stegosystem: a message is first encrypted and then embedded using Algorithm sample. The decoding process works analogously in the reverse direction.
Corollary 5. Provided that trapdoor one-way permutations exist, there is an SS-
An SS-RCCA Stegosystem
In this section, we propose a stegosystem that is steganographically secure against replayable adaptive chosen-covertext attacks. This stegosystem works for any covertext distribution that consists of a sequence of independent repetitions of a base-covertext distribution. Deviating from the notation of Section 2, we denote the base-covertext distribution by and the covertext distribution used by the stegosystem by Ø ¥ Ø ½ . As noted in Section 2.2, through the introduction of a history, our construction also generalizes to arbitrary covertext channels.
Let´K E Dµ be an RCCA-secure public-key cryptosystem with pseudorandom ciphertexts. Suppose its cleartexts are Ð-bit strings and its ciphertexts are Ò-bit strings.
A class of functions is called strongly ¾-universal [21] if, for all distinct Ü ½ Ü ¾ ¾ and all (not necessarily distinct) Ý ½ Ý ¾ ¾ , exactly ¾ functions from take Ü ½ to Ý ½ and Ü ¾ to Ý ¾ . Such a function family is sometimes simply called a strongly 2-universal hash function for brevity.
Description
The SS-RCCA stegosystem consists of a triple of algorithms´keygen encode decodeµ. The idea behind it is to encrypt a message using the public-key cryptosystem first and to embed the resulting ciphertext into a covertext sequence, as shown in Figure 1 .
The encoding method is based on the following algorithm sample, which samples a base-covertext according to such that a given -bit string is embedded in it. Under the name "rejection sampler," this algorithm has been suggested previously for steganography [2, 11, 15] , but was restricted to embedding single-bit messages only. · ½ 5: until ´Üµ or 6: return Ü Intuitively, algorithm sample returns a covertext chosen from distribution , but restricted to that subset of which is mapped to the given by . sample may also fail and return a covertext with ´µ , but this happens only with negligible probability in . As will be shown in Section 4.2, when is a random -bit string, is chosen randomly from a 2-universal hash function, and has sufficient min-entropy, then the output distribution of sample is statistically close to .
Algorithm sample
We now turn to the description of the stegosystem. Let ÐÓ for a positive constant ½ and let ¼ ½ denote a strongly 2-universal hash function.
Algorithm keygen chooses a random Ê and computes a tuple´× Ô µ K, by running the key generation algorithm of the cryptosystem. The output of keygen is the tuple´×Ô ×× µ ´´Ô µ × µ.
Algorithm encode first encrypts an input message Ñ using the given encryption algorithm E, which outputs in a ciphertext Ý. Assuming w.l.o.g. that Ý is an Ò-bit string such that Ò is polynomial in and Ò Ø , encode then repeatedly invokes sample to embed Ý in pieces of bits a time into a sequence of Ø covertext symbols. Formally:
Algorithm encode
Input: security parameter , a public key spk ´Ô µ, and a message Ñ ¾ ¼ ½ Ð to encode 
Analysis
This section is devoted to an analysis of the above stegosystem. Theorems 6 and 10 below together imply Theorem 2.
Theorem 6. (keygen, encode, decode) is a valid stegosystem.
Proof (Sketch). According to Definition 1, the only non-trivial steps are to show that the algorithms are efficient and that decode´½ ssk encode´½ spk Ñµµ Ñ for all Ñ ¾ ¼ ½ Ð except with negligible probability.
Efficiency follows immediately from the construction, the assumption ÐÓ , and the efficiency of the public-key cryptosystem. For reliability, it suffices to analyze the output of encode because the decoding operation is deterministic.
Consider iteration in Algorithm encode, in which Algorithm sample tries to find a covertext Ü that is mapped to Ý by . Because is chosen from a strongly 2-universal class of hash functions, the probability that in any particular iteration of sample, an Ü is chosen with ´Üµ Ý , is ½ ¾ .
Thus, since the iterations in sample are independent, sample returns with ´µ Ý only with some negligible probability¯´ µ provided that ÐÓ .
Hence, by the union bound, the probability that any iteration of Algorithm encode fails to embed the correct value is at most Ø¯´ µ, which is negligible.
Before we can analyze the security of the stegosystem´keygen, encode, decodeµ, we investigate the output distribution of Algorithm sample and derive the following result that may be of independent interest. It shows that the distribution of the output from Algorithm sample is statistically close to when sample is run with uniformly chosen inputs. The result also generalizes a theorem of Reyzin and Russell [15] .
Let Proof (Sketch). We prove that the stegosystem´keygen encode decodeµ is SS-RCCA by a reduction argument. Assume that it is not SS-RCCA and and hence there exists a (stego-)adversary´SA ½ SA ¾ µ that succeeds in the experiment of Definition 2 with probability ½ ¾ · AE´ µ for some non-negligible function AE. We construct an (encryption-)adversary´ ½ ¾ µ that has black-box access to´SA ½ SA ¾ µ and breaks the RCCA-security of´K E Dµ as follows.
Key generation: When ½ receives a public-key pk generated by K, it chooses Ê , computes spk ´pk µ, and invokes SA ½ with spk. We now analyze the environment simulated by the encryption-adversary´ ½ ¾ µ to the stegoadversary´SA ½ SA ¾ µ and the probability that the encryption-adversary can distinguish the encrypted messages.
Clearly, during key generation and the first decoding stage, the simulation for the stego-adversary SA ½ is perfect. During the encoding stage, a random bit is chosen according to Definition by a non-negligible quantity and establishes the theorem.
